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demonstrate that there is substantial concern about penalizing unconscious bias at the individual level and
that it will be difficult to generate broad support for regulation of unconscious bias at even the organizational
level unless the technology is a reliable detector of unconscious biases that lead to frequent or serious
antisocial behaviors.
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Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias
Philip E. Tetlock, Gregory Mitchell, and L. Jason Anastasopoulos
ABSTRACT
We present experimental results demonstrating how ideology shapes evaluations of technology
aimed at detecting unconscious biases: (1) liberals supported use of the technology to detect
unconscious racism but not unconscious anti-Americanism, whereas conservatives showed the
reverse pattern, (2) liberals and conservatives opposed punishing individuals for unconscious
bias but supported punishing organizations failing to use the technology to root out, re-
spectively, racism or anti-Americanism, (3) concerns about researcher bias and false accu-
sations mediated the effects of ideology on support for the technology, and (4) participants
taking strong initial stands were likelier than moderates to reconsider their positions. Our
findings demonstrate that there is substantial concern about penalizing unconscious bias at
the individual level and that it will be difficult to generate broad support for regulation of
unconscious bias at even the organizational level unless the technology is a reliable detector
of unconscious biases that lead to frequent or serious antisocial behaviors.
1. INTRODUCTION
Advances in psychology have moved mind reading out of the realm of
science fiction and into the courts. Criminal defendants have offered
brain scan evidence that supposedly reveals the truth of their claims of
innocence (Brown and Murphy 2010; Shen and Jones 2011). Plaintiffs
in civil employment cases, to support their claims of discrimination, have
offered social science research that supposedly shows that approximately
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75 percent of all white managers harbor unconscious biases toward
African Americans and act on those unconscious biases (Anthony G.
Greenwald, Expert Report, Satchell v. FedEx Express, N.D. Cal. 2006
[Nos. C 03-2659, C 03-2878]; Lane, Kang, and Banaji 2007; Barbara
F. Reskin, Declaration, Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., N.D. Cal. 2006
[No. C-04–3341]). Recently, a federal district judge proposed using the
primary social science tool for identifying unconscious bias, the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998), to
detect undisclosed biases in potential jurors (Bennett 2010) and perhaps
judges as well (Kang et al. 2012).1
The prospects for private and public uses of mind-reading technology
extend well beyond trials. The IAT, for instance, has been adapted to
identify pilots in training who are likely to take unsafe risks during
emergencies (Molesworth and Chang 2009), adults and youth at risk
for alcohol problems or marijuana use (Ames et al. 2007; Ostafin, Mar-
latt, and Greenwald 2008; Thush and Wiers 2007), persons at risk for
molesting children or committing other acts of violence (Nock and Banaji
2007a, 2007b; Snowden et al. 2004; Steffens, Yundina, and Panning
2008), and persons whose explicit statements about events differ from
their memories of these events (identifying those who knowingly, and
even unknowingly, tell lies) (Sartori et al. 2008). Companies may take
advantage of both the IAT and brain scan technology to uncover and
appeal to consumers’ unconscious preferences (Perkins et al. 2008; Ven-
katranum et al. 2012), and it is not inconceivable that brain scans will
someday accompany body scans at airports.
Given their potential to affect employment, detention, and privacy,
these new mind-reading tools raise important questions for legal policy
makers. Most fundamental, the ability to read minds raises the specter
of punishment of thought crimes and preventive incarceration of those
who harbor dangerous thoughts. Such punishment and incarceration
would arguably violate Mill’s ([1859] 1978, p. 9) harm principle: “{T}he
only purpose for which [state] power can be rightfully exercised over
1. The Implicit Association Test compares millisecond reaction-time differences in a test
taker’s responses to varying combinations of stimuli. If the test taker reacts more quickly
to some groups of stimuli than to others (for example, pictures of white faces paired with
pleasant words versus pictures of black faces paired with the same pleasant words), then
the test taker is assumed to have stronger associations with those stimuli or the stimuli
are said to be more congruent with the test taker’s unconscious attitudes (for example, a
test taker who reacts more quickly to white faces paired with pleasant words would be
said to be unconsciously biased in favor of whites and against blacks).
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any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.” But if anything is clear from the history of the harm
principle, it is the multidimensionality of the concept of harm (Harcourt
1999). People can feel wounded in a vast array of ways: individually or
collectively, cognitively or emotionally, and morally or spiritually. From
the time of Mill on, battles have been fought over the proper definition
of harm for regulatory purposes, and, as Harcourt (1999) notes, new
scientific evidence is often used in campaigns to expand or restrict the
definition of harm (for example, advocates of greater pornography reg-
ulation invoke social science studies on the psychological effects of view-
ing sexual and violent imagery in pornography).
The ability to detect unconscious biases presents the latest front in
battles over which harms warrant state action (compare Bagenstos
[2007] with Mitchell and Tetlock [2009]). The present study examines
people’s willingness to penalize individuals who hold unconscious biases
or the organizations that employ such individuals. The research goes
beyond this fundamental question to examine how different political
factions react to this new mind-reading technology when it is used to
address different societal problems and examines the psychological un-
derpinnings of support for, and opposition to, the regulation of uncon-
scious bias. We find widespread opposition to sanctions directed at un-
consciously biased individuals, but we find that liberals and conservatives
are willing to punish organizations that ignore the risks posed by un-
conscious biases among their employees depending on the nature of those
risks. Different valuations of the costs associated with false accusations
of bias and with failures to detect bias, and different views on the in-
tegrity of the underlying research, mediate this ideologically selective
willingness to punish organizations for unconscious bias.
2. AN EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY INTO SUPPORT FOR UNCONSCIOUS-BIAS
DETECTION AS AN EMPLOYMENT SCREEN AND AS A BASIS FOR
CIVIL PENALTIES
The most immediate prospect for widespread use of mind-reading tech-
nology involves employment decisions. Private employers may volun-
tarily use a detector of unconscious biases toward women or minorities
as part of the application process, and public employers may seek to
use unconscious-bias screens as an affirmative action taken to promote
the interests of women and minorities (Ayres 2001). For jobs involving
public safety or vulnerable populations, such as airline pilots, police
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officers, and child care workers, employers may use the new mind-
reading tools to screen out applicants who pose unacceptable safety risks
(Molesworth and Chang 2009; Steffens, Yundina, and Panning 2008).
Any such use of this new technology presents an inevitable trade-off
because no test can perfectly diagnose bias or predict future behavior:
the benefits of screening out potential risks (of discrimination or public
danger) must be weighed against the costs of falsely labeling an applicant
a risk and improperly denying employment to that person. Any orga-
nization that decides that the costs of using the technology outweigh the
potential benefits risks public second-guessing of that trade-off and pos-
sibly liability when the undetected risk discriminates or crashes a plane
(that is, the organization faces a second-order trade-off concerning the
costs and benefits associated with nonuse of the technology).
Makers of legal policy, by creating incentives or disincentives to use
unconscious-bias detection tools, will influence how organizations make
these trade-offs. In deciding how to design these incentives, policy mak-
ers are likely to be influenced by judgments about the reliability of the
unconscious-bias detection tools (how common are type I errors of ac-
cepting false accusations of bias and type II errors of rejecting true claims
of bias?) and about the costs associated with type I and type II errors
(how much harm will be suffered by society or the individual when
detection errors are made?).
We designed an experiment to examine the willingness of sophisti-
cated decision makers to use unconscious bias as an employment screen
and to impose penalties on companies for failing to use such a screen.
Our participants were highly educated managers participating in an ex-
ecutive education program who had extensive experience inside large
business organizations and held diverse political views. We devised the
experiment to examine whether the harm principle would constrain ad-
verse action against both the individual applicant and the organization
(by imposing liability for unconscious bias or failure to prevent acts
motivated by unconscious bias), and we included applications of this
technology to different societal problems to examine the generality of
adherence to the harm principle. In particular, we asked participants to
suppose that scientists had created technologies that can reveal attitudes
that people are not aware of possessing but that may influence their
actions nonetheless. In the control condition, the core applications of
these technologies (described as a mix of brain-scan technology and the
IAT’s reaction-time technology) were left unspecified. In the two treat-
ment conditions, these technologies were to be used in ways predicted
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to be objectionable to either liberal or conservative observers: to screen
employees for evidence of either unconscious racism (UR) against Af-
rican Americans or unconscious anti-Americanism (UAA). In the former
case, UR among managers posed a threat to the fair treatment of African
American employees in the workplace, whereas in the latter case, UAA
among workers in public safety positions posed a threat to the safe
operation of the nation’s airports and other vulnerable facilities.
On the basis of research into the value differences of liberals and
conservatives (for example, Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992; Tetlock
1986), we predicted that these shifting uses of technology would provoke
shifting patterns of value conflict among those who attach differential
importance to civil liberties, equal employment opportunity, and na-
tional security. Absent a strong threat to a countervailing value such as
equality or security, we predicted that commitment to the harm principle
would constrain punitiveness and motivate opposition to the technology:
it will be hard to justify a punitive stance toward people who have yet
to do anything wrong—and harder still to justify such a stance toward
persons portrayed less like agents endowed with free will and more like
automatons enacting unconscious scripts. However, to the degree that
there is a threat to a countervailing value, it should become increasingly
difficult even for those who see themselves as defenders of civil liberty
to justify inaction—which becomes tantamount to a stance of moral
indifference to foreseeable threats to either equal employment oppor-
tunity or national security: how can anyone justify standing idly by when
society would be obviously better off if preventive (albeit arguably pu-
nitive) measures were taken to stop unconscious attitudes from causing
predictable harm? Thus, how defensible people deem expansion of the
harm principle to cover unconscious-bias detection and sanctioning
should hinge on ideological sympathies and antipathies, with liberals
seeing the frequency and consequences of UR as sufficient to justify
imposing costs on individuals and organizations but not in the case of
UAA and with conservatives showing the opposite pattern.
In addition to the role of political values, we examined how views
about the underlying science on unconscious bias, views about the prev-
alence of and harms associated with unconscious biases, and pressure
to be consistent would affect support for use of unconscious-bias de-
tection as an employment screen. We examined the influence of scientific
views and views about unconscious bias as a social problem by gathering
data on the perceived integrity of this research, the potential for misuse
of the unconscious-bias detection technology, and perceptions of threats
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posed by unconscious bias and then used these responses as mediators
in our data analyses. We examined the consistency constraint by ex-
posing participants to an alternative use of the unconscious-bias detec-
tion technology after they had already considered its use in one setting
(for example, after considering whether the technology should be used
to prevent risks of UR, participants then considered whether it should
be used to prevent risks of UAA). Although our participants were not
political actors, they were elites whose views may mirror those of policy
makers. Accordingly, understanding how our participants viewed the
underlying science and potential harms and whether they could justify
different outcomes in the racism domain versus the terrorism domain
sheds light on how policy makers are likely to address unconscious-bias
detection proposals. In sum, our study tested the following specific hy-
potheses.
1. As is consistent with the harm principle and psychological research
on blaming (Tetlock 2002; Tetlock et al. 2007; Tetlock, Self, and Singh
2010), we predicted that few observers will deem it justifiable to take
directly punitive measures against people on the sole basis of attitudes
that have yet to translate into harmful acts and that people may not
even be aware of possessing. However, observers will be more willing
to support indirectly punitive measures that impose special compliance
burdens on those who could have taken measures to prevent unconscious
biases from manifesting and harming others.
2. Individual difference research on value hierarchies (for example,
Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992; Tetlock 1986) has repeatedly found that
conservatives put higher priority on the values of crime control and
national security and lower priority on equality. Accordingly, we pre-
dicted that conservatives will be more willing to downplay fairness and
civil libertarian qualms about invasions of privacy and false-positive
labeling if they see a good chance to detect widespread unconscious
attitudes linked to a tendency to harm these core values and less willing
to downplay fairness and libertarian concerns on behalf of lower ranked
values and more prone to mobilize counterarguments for resisting adop-
tion of the technology, such as concerns about false-positive labeling of
high scorers as racists, about an activist scientific community, and about
creating an oppressive accountability regime.
3. Research on value hierarchies also indicates that liberals put higher
priority on equality and remedying past collective wrongs and lower
priority on crime control and national security. Accordingly, we pre-
dicted that liberals will be readier to downplay civil libertarian qualms
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about invasions of privacy and false-positive labeling if they see a good
chance to detect widespread unconscious attitudes predictive of a ten-
dency to harm these core values, and less willing to downplay fairness
and libertarian concerns on behalf of lower ranked values and more
prone to mobilize counterarguments for resisting adoption of the tech-
nology, such as concerns about false-positive labeling of high scorers as
terrorist threats, about an activist scientific community, and about cre-
ating an oppressive accountability regime.
4. Research on political attitudes indicates that many people are hard-
to-classify moderates who do not fit the ideological ideal-type templates
of liberals or conservatives (Kinder 1998; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986).
These respondents will be more consistent in their stances toward harm-
expansion arguments.
5. People need socially acceptable rationales for unfamiliar and po-
tentially controversial decisions (Tetlock et al. 2007; Tetlock, Self, and
Singh 2010), and, depending on the subculture, these rationales are likely
to include ontological justifications (claims about the pervasiveness of
undesirable unconscious attitudes), epistemic justifications (claims about
the objectivity of the research community), and ethical justifications
(claims about the relative dangers of false-positive versus false-negative
classifications of people). It follows that the more one’s ideological out-
look predisposes one to see false-positive attributions as more serious
than false-negative attributions, the more it predisposes one to see un-
desirable unconscious attitudes as pervasive; the more it predisposes one
to be suspicious of the scientists, the more that outlook should predict
opposition to societal applications.
6. Asking people questions that highlight the reputational risk of
harboring double standards activates a reflective mind-set in which peo-
ple balance the need to appear consistent (“I am not a hypocrite”) against
their affinity for one application of the technology over the other (Tetlock
2002). We predicted that people who embraced the first-presented ap-
plication (strong liberals and conservatives who respectively welcomed
advances in detecting UR and UAA) would feel consistent pressure to
adopt the same technology in the service of a less congenial cause. They
will then have three options for the reduction of value conflict: accept
an unacceptable application, defend a double standard by explaining
why one application is more acceptable than the other, or reconsider
their support for the previously more congenial application. All three
options are possible in a value-pluralism framework (Tetlock 1986), but
in the special circumstances of this experiment, we predict an exception
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to the generalization that those at the political extremes will be most
unwilling to reconsider their positions: in the absence of readily acces-
sible reasons for justifying a double standard, respondents on the left
and right who have just accepted the first application and then confront
a distasteful second application should find reconsideration of the first
application the most attractive option.
3. METHOD
3.1. Participants
Ninety-five managers ( ; 64 men, 31 women) from executiveM p 34age
or MBA programs at the University of California, Berkeley, participated
voluntarily for no compensation or course credit.
3.2. Materials and Procedure
Participants first provided demographic information and placed them-
selves on a 9-point liberalism versus conservatism self-identification scale
(1 p strongly liberal in the conventional sense of the term, 5 p mod-
erate, and 9 p strongly conservative in the conventional sense of the
term). Participants also rated their agreement with the following value
statements on a 9-point scale (1p strong disagreement, 5p uncertainty,
and 9 p strong agreement): (1) “I value social equality and support
stronger measures to reduce poverty and discrimination” (egalitarian-
ism); (2) “I value social equality but I am wary of policies that sacrifice
individual rights to achieve equality” (libertarian constraint on egali-
tarianism); (3) “I value national security and support moving much more
proactively against these threats” (national security); (4) “I value na-
tional security but I am wary of policies that sacrifice individual rights
to achieve security” (libertarian constraint on national security).
3.2.1. Experimental Manipulation. Participants were then randomly as-
signed to one of three experimental conditions representing different
intended uses of a new technology for measuring unconscious biases:
participants in the control scenario reacted to a description of the new
technology that mentioned no specific intended application, participants
in the UR scenario judged the same technology but learned that its
primary application was for detecting unconscious bias against African
Americans by employers, and participants in the UAA scenario judged
the same technology but learned that its primary application was for
detecting UAA among employees in sensitive jobs.
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The control group scenario informed participants that “[c]ognitive
neuroscientists have long suspected that human behavior is much less
under conscious control than many human beings think. They have now
developed a new method of testing this hypothesis—and for measuring
unconscious attitudes that people are not even aware of possessing.”
The technology was described as involving “measures based on a sta-
tistical combination of two types of data: data derived from functional
MRI of the brain and from millisecond-reaction-time differentials in how
rapidly people respond to stimuli flashing across computer screens.”
Participants were also told that in “follow-up work testing the validity
of their measures, the researchers have found evidence that job-relevant
unconscious attitudes (such as general dislike of employers) are wide-
spread in the population and that scores on these measures of uncon-
scious attitudes have the power to predict actual behavior, not just ‘brain
waves.’”
The UR scenario was identical to the control scenario except that the
technology was described as detecting unconscious prejudicial attitudes
among European Americans: “In follow-up work testing the validity of
their measures, researchers have found evidence that unconscious prej-
udices against African Americans are widespread in the population and
that scores on these measures of unconscious attitudes have the power
to predict actual behavior, not just ‘brain waves.’” The UAA scenario
was identical to the control scenario except that the technology was
described as detecting unconscious–anti-American attitudes among
American Muslims: “In follow-up work testing the validity of their mea-
sures, researchers have found evidence that unconscious–anti-American
attitudes are widespread among American Muslims and that scores on
these measures of unconscious–anti-American attitudes have the power
to predict actual behavior, not just ‘brain waves.’”
3.2.2. Dependent Measures. After reading one of these three scenarios,
participants indicated their level of agreement with the following state-
ments on 9-point scales (unless otherwise noted, 1 p strong disagree-
ment, 5 p somewhat agree, and 9 p strong agreement):
Misuse Potential . “All technologies can, of course, be abused. Do you
agree that this technology has unusually serious potential to be abused?”
Scientific Value . “Do you agree that this technology has potentially
great scientific value?”
Perceptions of Pervasiveness . “The researchers are probably right
about the pervasiveness of unconscious prejudice against African Amer-
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icans among European Americans.” (In the UAA condition, participants
were asked about unconscious–anti-American attitudes among American
Muslims.)
Harm Principle . “Taking legal action against individuals on the sole
basis of claims about their unconscious attitudes (not their behavior)
would be unacceptable.”
Researcher Bias. “The scientists doing this research may have a po-
litical agenda that is biasing their work.”
Appropriate Use. “Society should use this technology to ensure that
managers with unconscious prejudice against African Americans [uncon-
scious anti-American attitudes] are prevented from making harmful de-
cisions.”
False-Posit ive versus False-Negative Attr ibutions . “Which error do
you see as more serious: an employer who concludes that someone has
an unconscious prejudice against African Americans [anti-American at-
titude] when that person does not VERSUS an employer who fails to
identify someone who really does have an unconscious prejudice against
African Americans [an unconscious anti-American attitude]?” (1 p the
first error is far more serious, 5p the two errors are equally serious, and
9 p the second error is far more serious).
Fai lure to Use the Technology . “Imagine that a company refused to
use the technology to screen its employees to ensure that they did not
have high scores on the measure of unconscious prejudice against African
Americans [anti-American attitudes]. As a result, a manager who would
otherwise have been screened out was in a position to make flawed de-
cisions that damaged the careers of African-American employees [was
responsible for a security lapse that led indirectly to an accidental death].
How appropriate is it to increase the damage award against the company
for not using the screening test?” (1 p extremely inappropriate, 5 p
somewhat appropriate, and 9 p extremely appropriate).
Reflection on Init ial Opinions. (a) Participants in the UR condition
were asked if they would change their support for the technology if it
were used to detect UAA among managers making sensitive national se-
curity decisions, and participants in the UAA condition were asked if they
would change their level of support for the technology if it were used to
detect UR against African Americans (1pmuch less support, 5p exactly
the same support, and 9 p much more support). (b) Participants in the
control condition were asked whether they would change their support if
the technology were used to detect UR and if it were used to detect UAA.
(c) Participants in all conditions were asked, “[L]ooking back at your
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix for Ideology Questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ideology self-report 1.00
Egalitarianism .83 1.00
Libertarianism-egalitarianism balancing .67 .58 1.00
National security .65 .61 .44 1.00
Libertarianism–national security balancing .58 .58 .19 .6 1.00
answers, do you think you were initially too eager to embrace or too quick
to reject use of the technology?” (1 p I was too eager to embrace use of
the technology, 5 p I wouldn’t change any judgments, and 9 p I was
too quick to reject use of the technology).
After answering the questions for dependent measures, participants
were debriefed, and the experimental session ended.
4. RESULTS
The correlations in Table 1 show that self-identified conservatives (on
the ideology scale) were traditional in orientation (attaching lower value
to equality and higher value to national security), whereas liberals were
social democratic in orientation (displaying mirror-image priorities). We
subjected the ideology and five value scales to a maximum likelihood
factor analysis with oblimin rotation, and the first factor accounted for
74 percent of the variance, with the following variable loadings: ideology
(.91), egalitarianism (.84), libertarian constraint on equality (.74),
national security (.64), and libertarian constraint on national security
(.47). As these loadings imply, negative scores indicate conservative value
priorities (higher on national security and lower on equality), whereas
positive scores indicate liberal value priorities (lower on national security
and higher on equality). The average and median scores on this factor
were .00 and .09. Figure 1 shows the overall distribution of scores:
the center of political gravity in the sample was centrist, with roughly
equal numbers of participants falling to the left and right of that cluster.
Scores on this ideology factor served as the composite measure of ide-
ology in the analyses that follow.
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for all of the
dependent measures. We ran a set of three ordinary least squares (OLS)
and ordered probit regressions for each dependent variable that tested
the main-effect and ideology-by-use hypotheses while controlling for
gender and age (Green 2009). We focus on the OLS results; the probit
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Figure 1. Liberal/conservative factor score distribution
regressions produced similar results, which demonstrate the robustness
of our results across metric assumptions about the dependent variables
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Table 3 reports the key OLS and ordered
probit findings.
4.1. Test of Hypothesis 1
Consistent with the harm principle, there was near unanimity across
conditions that it was unacceptable to take legal action against individ-
uals on the sole basis of their unconscious attitudes (Mcontrol p 7.93;
Mracism p 8.15; Manti-Americanism p 8.22; F(2, 92) p 1.18; p p .31). Thus,
there was general support for the harm principle when the punitive action
toward those with undesirable unconscious attitudes would be direct.
There was also general opposition to imposing greater damages on com-
panies that considered but rejected use of the technology to screen out
managers with undesirable attitudes where that technology might have
prevented harm (Mcontrol p 2.3; Mracism p 2.09; Manti-Americanism p 2.25;
F(2, 92) p .32; p p .73). Participants were more accepting of the
proposition that society should use the technology to seek to prevent
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managers with undesirable attitudes from making harmful decisions
(Mcontrol p 4.8; Mracism p 4.88; Manti-Americanism p 4.97; F(2, 92) p .17; p
p .85).
Thus, participants’ responses in the aggregate were consistent with
the harm principle’s constraint on direct punitive action, and this con-
straint seemed to extend even to indirect action punishing employers
who failed to screen out managers and employees with potentially harm-
ful unconscious attitudes. However, these group averages conceal con-
siderable individual differences by political ideology within the different
experimental conditions, as we discuss in Section 4.2.
4.2. Tests of Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4
As predicted, the correlations between ideology and support for use of
the unconscious-bias detection technology shifted as a function of which
political values the technology purportedly sought to protect. Using the
control group as the baseline, we found that when the purported goal
was to identify unconscious bias against African Americans, conserva-
tives were more likely to see serious misuse potential (bideology#racism p
1.30; t(87)p 3.45; p ! .01), to be skeptical of researchers’ claims about
the pervasiveness of these negative unconscious attitudes (bideology#racismp
1.28; t(87) p 3.43; p ! .01), to view false-positive classifications
of people as prejudiced as the more serious error (bideology#racismp1.19;
t(87) p 2.95; p ! .01), to oppose using the technology in routine
business operations (bideology#racism p .83; t(87) p 2.34; p ! .05),
and to oppose increasing the civil liability of companies that reject using
the technology, even though using the technology could have preventedharm
(bideology#racism p 1.11; t(87) p 3.06; p ! .01).
By contrast, when the purported goal was to identify UAA among
American Muslims, the ideology# treatment coefficients reversed signs
in many instances. Although liberals were not more likely to see serious
misuse potential (bideology#anti-Americanismp .55; t(87)p 1.45; p 1 .05),
they were more skeptical that the technology had much scientific value
(bideology#anti-Americanism p 1.31; t(87) p 3.30; p ! .01), more skeptical of
researchers’ claims about the pervasiveness of these negative unconscious
attitudes (bideology#anti-Americanism p .75; t(87) p 2.01; p ! .05), more sus-
picious that the scientists have a political agenda (bideology#anti-Americanismp
1.52; t(87)p4.05; p ! .001), more opposed to using the technology
in routine business operations (bideology#anti-Americanismp 1.49; t(87)p 4.22;
p ! .001), and more opposed to increasing the civil liability of companies
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that reject the technology, even though using it could have prevented
harm (bideology#anti-Americanism p 1.08; t(87) p 2.97; p ! .01).
To test hypothesis 4, we assessed the degree to which these effects
were driven by participants with strong ideological sentiments. We per-
formed a tertile split of participants’ scores on the left-right factor from
the maximum likelihood analysis and then created a “supportive of the
technology” index by averaging perceptions of the value of the tech-
nology and support for applications of the technology. This analysis
revealed that, whereas liberals and conservatives showed full-fledged
preference reversals in their support for the unconscious–mind-reading
technology, moderates showed no shift in support for the technology as
a function of its intended use. Liberals supported the technology when
it was aimed at unconscious prejudice, but conservatives did not (Mliberals
p 5.75 versusMconservativesp 4.23; t(16)p 4.45; p ! .001); conservatives
supported the technology when it was aimed at anti-Americanism, but
liberals did not (Mconservativesp 5.9 versus Mliberalsp 4.14; t(19)p4.29;
p ! .001); moderates showed moderate support for use of the technology
across conditions (Manti-Americanism p 4.91 versus Mracism p 4.90 versus
Mcontrol p 5.15; F(2, 28) p .58; p p .57).
4.3. Test of Hypothesis 5
We predicted that error aversion (preference to avoid false-positive over
false-negative attributions), perceptions of the pervasiveness of bias in
the general population, and perceptions of researcher bias wouldmediate
the effects of participants’ ideology on support for the technology. To
test these ideas, we ran a series of OLS mediational analyses. Our de-
pendent variable was a two-item composite indicator of support for
applications of the technology: the average of the within-subject re-
sponses to questions on using the technology as an employment screen
and on increasing civil liability for company failure to use the technology
( ). As can be seen in Table 4, this mediation analysis revealedrp .44
that when the goal of the technology is to detect unconscious bias against
African Americans, attribution error aversion preferences fully mediated
the relationship between ideology and support for the technology, and
perceptions of researcher bias played virtually no mediating role. Further
analysis revealed that the error aversion result is due to liberal respon-
dents (but not moderate or conservative respondents) adjusting their
error aversion preferences when the goal of the technology is to detect
unconscious bias against African Americans. By contrast, when the goal
of the technology is to detect anti-Americanism among Muslims, the
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Table 4. Mediation Analyses Using Error Aversion Preferences and Researcher Bias
Racism Condition
Anti-Americanism
Condition
With
Mediator
Without
Mediator
With
Mediator
Without
Mediator
Error aversion preferences
as mediator:
Degrees of freedom 57 56 56 55
R2 .37 .48 .52 .52
Ideology # treatment 1.20a** .67b 1.78a*** 1.78b***
Ideology .11 .15 .08 .08
Error aversion preferences .38** .01
Researcher bias as mediator:
Degrees of freedom 57 56 56 55
R2 .37 .55 .52 .61
Ideology # treatment 1.20a** .92b** 1.78a*** 1.13b**
Ideology .11 .01 .08 .01
Scientists conducting research
are biased .47*** .38**
aUnmediated b.
bMediated b.
** .p ! .01
*** .p ! .001
mediation analysis revealed less support for the mediational hypotheses:
only perceptions of researcher bias emerged as a significant mediator,
partially mediating the relationship between ideology and support for
applying the technology.2
2. All of the mediation results were confirmed by Sobel tests and 95 percent confidence
intervals from bootstrapped resamplings of the indirect effect ( ). The Sobel test hasa1# b1
become the de facto standard for mediation in social psychology, but psychometricians
have warned that, although the standard errors for each coefficient are accurate as long
as regression assumptions are met, the standard errors for interaction coefficients in the
Sobel test are somewhat unstable, especially for smaller samples (Shrout and Bolger 2002;
Preacher and Hayes 2004; Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010). We therefore used both tests to
ensure that our findings were robust. Results of the Sobel tests and bootstrapping of the
interaction with 5,000 replications consistently yielded strong evidence of medi-a1# b1
ation in the unconscious-racism condition for false-negative or false-positive balancing (DV
6 in Table 3) but not for perceptions of researcher bias (DV 5) using the Sobel test (DV
6: Sobel , ; DV 5: Sobel , ) and using the bootstrappedzp 2.35 p ! .05 zp 1.33 p 1 .10
interaction (DV 6: 95 percent confidence interval [CI] [.33, .03]; DV 5: 95a1# b1
percent CI [.27, .05]). In the unconscious–anti-Americanism condition, however, strong
evidence of mediation was found for perceptions of researcher bias but not false-positive
or false-negative balancing using the Sobel test (DV 6: Sobel , ; DV 5: Sobelzp .11 p 1 .10
, ) and using the bootstrapped interaction (DV 6: 95 percent CIzp 2.80 p ! .01 a1# b1
[.04, .07]; DV 5: 95 percent CI [.07, .37]).
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To explore why error aversions were such a powerful mediator, we clas-
sified participants (on the basis of their responses on the error aversion
dependent measure) as showing greater concern about false positives, ap-
proximately equal concern about both errors, or greater concern about false
negatives. We then calculated mean levels of support for policy applications
for these three groups across the control, UR, and UAA conditions. This
analysis revealed little support in the control condition for applications of
the technology across participants. But in the UR condition, participants
concerned with false negatives (letting racism go undetected) were more
supportive of the technology than were those in the control group (Mracism
p 5.25 versus Mcontrol p 3.5; t(10) p 3.95; p ! .01), whereas those con-
cerned with false positives (false accusations of bias) were less supportive
(Mracismp 2.83 versusMcontrolp 3.63; t(18)p 2.88; p ! .05). Those equally
concerned about false positives and false negatives were statistically indis-
tinguishable in the UR and control conditions (Mracismp 3.30 versusMcontrol
p 3.53; t(29) p 1.02; p 1 .10).
Given that error aversions were a strong mediator of the ideology#
racism coefficient, ideology must be correlated with false-positive or
false-negative preferences. This correlation could arise in twoways: false-
positive or false-negative preferences influence ideology that, in turn,
influences shifting support across contexts for the technology or ideology
influences false-positive or false-negative preferences. As noted above,
we find strong evidence for the second explanation, and rejecting the
first explanation is straightforward. If error aversions influence ideology,
the following would be true: ideology and error aversion preferences
would be strongly correlated within all three conditions, and error aver-
sion preferences would mediate the ideology # condition coefficients
for both the UR condition and the UAA condition. But the correlations
between ideology and error aversions vary across conditions: weakly
positive in the control condition ( ), strongly negative in the URrp .18
condition ( ),3 and weakly negative in the UAA conditionrp.55
( ). By contrast, if ideology influences context-specific error aver-rp.15
sions, we would observe the pattern of correlations discussed earlier.
These findings suggest that, in the race domain, liberals minimized cog-
nitive dissonance by shifting other preferences to conform to their ide-
ology, whereas conservatives were less prone to do this in the national
security context, perhaps because national security was less salient to
3. This strong negative correlation indicates that more liberal respondents were more
concerned with false negatives and more conservative respondents with false positives.
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this subgroup of conservatives in this context or because liberals and
conservatives respond differentially to trade-offs of this sort.
4.4. Test of Hypothesis 6
We predicted that a subject’s initial position would constrain later ones
but that people would abandon initial positions if consistency pressures
required them to embrace an application that they would strongly prefer
to reject. To test this prediction, we examined reactions to new uses of
the technology in four contrasts: from no specified use (control condi-
tion) to use for UR detection, from the control condition to use for UAA
detection, from use for UR detection to use for UAA detection, and from
use for UAA detection to use for UR detection.
In the switch from the control condition to UR detection, we find a
significant liberal versus conservative crossover in which liberals offered
more support for the technology on knowing its intended use (using the
tertile split on the ideology factor,Mliberalsp 5.7 versusMconservativesp 4.08;
t(19)p 4.26; p ! .001). But when the use switched from UAA detection
to UR detection, support among liberals and conservatives did not differ
(Mliberals p 4.44 versus Mconservatives p 4.80; t(14.38) p 1; p p .33).
Similarly, when the application switched from detecting UR to detecting
UAA, support among liberals and conservatives was indistinguishable
(Mliberals p 4.83 versus Mconservatives p 4.83; t(19.6) ! 1; p p .67). The
disappearance of a robust between-conditions effect when information
from the other conditions becomes known is suggestive of an anchoring
or consistency-pressure effect: initially judging a technology linked to an
unpalatable application for liberals or conservatives made the technology
undesirable to those groups, even when the application shifted to causes
that those groups support in isolation.
To assess the impact of considering alternative applications on will-
ingness to reconsider initial support for the technology, we ran regres-
sions exploring the relationship between ideology and interest in recon-
sidering initial support. Our analysis revealed that considering
potentially dissonant applications in the UR and UAA conditions caused
liberals and conservatives, respectively, to reassess their views of the
technology. Using the control group baseline, we found evidence that,
in the UR condition, liberals were likelier to believe that they were too
quick to embrace the technology and conservatives were likelier to say
that they were too quick to reject it (bideology#race p .76; t(87) p 1.94;
p ! .10). In the UAA condition, we found the opposite: conservatives
believed that they were too quick to embrace the technology and liberals
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Table 5. Too Eager to Embrace or Reject Technology by Extremity of Ideological
Commitment
Extremists Nonextremists
N Mean SD N Mean SD
Control 12 5.08 1 18 4.83 .5
Racism 13 4.46 1.2 20 4.85 .6
Anti-Americanism 12 3.75 1.14 20 4.9 .5
Note. Responses below 5 indicate that the participant was too eager to embrace the tech-
nology; responses above 5 indicate that the participant was too quick to reject the technology.
believed that they were too quick to reject it (bideology#anti-Americanismp.86;
t(87) p 2.18; p ! .05).
To test the ideologue hypothesis, which posits that extremists would be
less open to changing their minds, we created a relative extremism dummy
variable based on the distribution of ideology scores. Extremistsweredefined
as those who scored at the right or left extremes on the ideological self-
identification scale. We included this extremism dummy variable in a re-
gression equation, included the covariates in the previous regression, and
used the control group as the baseline. Contrary to the ideologue hypothesis,
in both the UR and UAA conditions, extremists were likelier than non-
extremists to conclude that they had been too eager to embrace the tech-
nology (bextremists#racep.44, t(84)p2.28, p ! .05; bextremists#anti-Americanism
p .55, t(84) p 3.79, p ! .001). We should, however, be careful not
to overinterpret this result. A simple argument of regression toward the
mean would predict on purely statistical grounds that extremists should,
on second judgment, be more likely than moderates to move toward the
sample average. After all, moderates already occupy that ground close to
the sample average. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for extremists
and nonextremists on this measure of willingness to second-guess initial
responses.
5. DISCUSSION
Our results underscore how easily a new evidence-gathering technology that
could radically expand the reach of the law can become politicized. When
we examined how participants in the UR-detection condition and the UAA-
detection condition responded to the technology in comparison to partic-
ipants in the control condition (in which no use was specified), we found
strong relationships between political ideology and perceptions of the mis-
use potential of the technology, of the scientific significance of the tech-
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nology, and of the objectivity of the scientific community linked to the
technology. Liberals were consistently more open to the technology, and
to punishing organizations that rejected its use, when the technology was
aimed at detecting UR among company managers; conservatives were
consistently more open to the technology, and to punishing organizations
that rejected its use, when the technology was aimed at detecting UAA
among American Muslims.
This ideologically selective willingness to apply the technology in
punitive ways was fully mediated by valuations of the relative seriousness
of false positives versus false negatives in the domain of discrimination
and partially mediated by heightened skepticism toward the scientific
community that produced the technology in the national security do-
main. This pattern indicates that people play favorites and draw on well-
defined ideological scripts to justify that favoritism (Kunda 1990; Tetlock
2002): the justifications may take the form of ontological justifications
(claims about the pervasiveness of this or that type of threat to the social
order), epistemic justifications (claims about the objectivity or lack of
objectivity of scientific communities), or ethical justifications (claims
about the relative dangers of either false-positive or false-negative clas-
sification errors).
There were differences, however, in the mediators of technology op-
position. Liberal participants were reluctant to raise concerns about re-
searcher bias as a basis for opposition, a reluctance consistent with
MacCoun and Paletz’s (2009) finding that citizens tend to believe that
scientists hold liberal rather than conservative political views. If scientists
are expected to be liberals, then liberal participants should discount the
likelihood of researchers’ bias as an explanation for findings in the UAA
line of research, which our liberal participants did, but conservatives
should see researchers’ bias as a cause for concern about the UR line of
research, which our conservative participants did. Left-liberal opposition
to using technology to detect unconscious–anti-American bias was
grounded in concerns about the relative costs of false positives and false
negatives, whereas error costs played little mediating role in conservative
opposition to using the technology to detect UR. In short, conservatives
worry that liberal scientists have smuggled their value judgments into a
line of research that happens to advance a liberal agenda, while liberals
worry that valid science may be used to advance a conservative agenda
(that is, that companies or policy makers will reach a trade-off of type
I and II errors different from their own).4
4. We do not claim to have exhausted all possible mediators of motivated reasoning
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Notwithstanding ideological differences in support for punishing or-
ganizations when an employee’s UR or UAA leads to harm, we found
important limits on how far both liberals and conservatives were willing
to go in holding others accountable for unconscious bias. One constraint
was the harm principle: virtually no one was ready to abandon that
principle and endorse punishing individuals for unconscious attitudes
per se—even though there was some support for indirect punishment in
the form of using the technology to limit job opportunities for people
with undesirable unconscious biases. Another constraint was a desire to
appear principled: when directly asked, few respondents saw it as de-
fensible to endorse the technology for one type of application but not
for the other—even though there were strong signs from our experiment
that differential ideological groups would do just that when not directly
confronted with this potential hypocrisy. The harm principle constraint
suggests widespread, albeit flexible, opposition to an excessively intru-
sive accountability regime that enforces laws against thought crimes and
thought torts. The consistency constraint suggests widespread aversion
to double standards and sensitivity to charges of hypocrisy and duplicity
but only when that inconsistency is apparent.
Although most respondents were reluctant to acknowledge double
standards for embracing the technology, the process of thinking about
different applications encouraged a more critical second look at initial
support for the technology—and those at the political extremes, who
offered more initial support for the technology, had more rethinking to
do when forced to consider a less palatable use of the technology. Here
we have a special circumstance under which those at the extremes were
more disposed than centrists to consider the possibility that they made
a mistake. At first glance, this runs counter to political science and
psychological research suggesting that extremists are more likely to dis-
play rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity (McClosky and Chong 1985;
Tetlock 1984, 2005). The contradiction is, however, more apparent than
real. As already noted, this result may be attributable simply to regres-
sion toward the mean (much more room for movement toward the mean
about science and technology. For example, Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman (2011)
found that persons holding different cultural risk profiles systematically overestimated the
scientific consensus in support of positions consistent with those risk profiles (for example,
persons seeing climate change as a serious risk believed there was greater consensus among
climate scientists than did those less concerned with climate change). Our results and those
of MacCoun and Paletz (2009) suggest that liberals would be likelier than conservatives
to cite scientific consensus as a basis for technology support, whereas conservatives would
be likelier to dismiss the consensus as value driven instead of science driven.
U N C O N S C I O U S B I A S / 105
from the extremists than from the moderates). And even if a purely
statistical explanation is not adequate, there is a quite straightforward
psychological explanation. This experiment confronted the more ex-
treme participants with a choice between defending a double standard
(explaining why one application is more acceptable) and acknowledging
that they may have erred initially (reconsidering their support for the
ideologically agreeable technology). Given the cognitive complexity of
the task of justifying a double standard on a novel issue, it is not so
surprising that those with more extreme views were more disposed to
the lower effort option of simply backtracking from their initial position.
We should expect political groups to exploit the new mind-reading
technology to target social ills they see as most pressing and to be myopic
in doing so until confronted with the perverse effects of their advocacy.
Endorsing the reliability and accepting the risks of a technology in one
legal battle constrains one’s ability to attack that technology in another
legal battle. Our study suggests antidotes to such short-sighted advocacy:
advocacy groups should include in their strategy formation moderates
who are likely to have different type I and II error aversions than ex-
tremists, should encourage and reward dissent (Nemeth, Brown, and
Rogers 2001), or appoint a devil’s advocate whose role is to argue force-
fully for the perverse effects of the contemplated strategies (Katzenstein
1996). Even the most committed advocates may reconsider their tactics
when alerted to the unintended effects of those tactics.
In addition to informing debates over the use of mind-reading tech-
nology for evidential purposes (Shen and Jones 2011), our findings have
relevance for the larger debate over preventive measures aimed at those
who pose dangers to society and for the specific ongoing debate over
the antidiscrimination laws aimed at UR (Tetlock and Mitchell 2009).
All three groups in our study—liberals, conservatives, and moder-
ates—opposed legal actions aimed directly at unconsciously biased in-
dividuals. When a danger presents itself only as a threat in the form of
genetic or unconscious propensities, a rhetoric of just deserts, with an
emphasis on retribution for harm, is unlikely to convince the public to
support measures aimed at these individuals (Cameron, Payne, and
Knobe 2010; Morse 1999). However, all participants were more ac-
cepting of societal measures aimed at preventing the harms of uncon-
scious biases. These findings suggest that a move to a public health model
of unconscious bias and its harms may be an effective strategy for ad-
vocates of legal applications of mind-reading technology.
Yet changing the public’s mind-set to see discrimination, terrorism,
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and other potential threats of unconscious bias as public health problems
will take advocates of state action to prevent future harms only so far
(Morse 1999): treating unconscious bias as a disease to be managed
through preventive measures against individuals will still require either
a fundamental change in how we conceive of each other, from moral
beings to disease vectors (as argued to justify civil commitments of per-
sons posing a threat to themselves or others), or proof that the targets
of state action can be motivated to prevent the spread of the disease and
that the benefits of such measures exceed the costs (as argued to justify
criminal penalties for the transmission of HIV).5 Some who argue for
applications of UR research to the law do employ the public health rhetoric
of disease control (for example, Bagenstos 2007)—and our findings un-
derscore the shrewdness of this move politically and legally—but there is
no consensus on either the degree to which unconscious biases can be
prevented from influencing behavior (Cameron, Payne, and Knobe 2010)
or the harms actually associated with these biases (Mitchell and Tetlock
2009; Tetlock and Mitchell 2009).
Finally, our findings suggest that suspicions about tainted science may
grow when scientists reporting findings challenging the conventional
wisdom become involved in the political and legal debates on the policy
relevance of those findings. When social scientists have become part of
an explicit effort to expand antidiscrimination law and have invoked
unconscious-bias research in support of that effort (Potier 2004), these
public political statements inevitably raised suspicions about researcher
bias, especially among conservatives. Advocates of legal applications of
UR research seem to have understood the credibility-corrosive effects of
this tactic and have sought to defend the scientific status of the research
by dismissing doubts about the validity of this research as politically
motivated backlash (Bagenstos 2007; Kang 2010; Lane, Kang, and Ba-
naji 2007). Such counterattacks themselves may be assimilated to fit
preexisting ideological viewpoints for extremists, and their effects on
moderates await further study.
Most fundamental, our results raise serious questions about the role
of scientists in policy debates and the dangers of crossing the traditional
fact/value divide. Our participants understood that the use of even sound
5. Note, however, with respect to a consequentialist justification for state intervention,
that participants in our study were unwilling to endorse legal actions against individuals
with unconscious biases even when those biases increased the likelihood of acts of terrorism.
Whether denial of employment for such individuals, rather than legal action, would be
seen as justified in light of the threat they may pose awaits study.
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scientific technology requires value judgments. Deference to science will
take scientist policy advocates only so far. Once scientists have been
categorized as advocates of an issue (Pielke 2007) on a particular policy
trade-off, they risk losing the deference that their linkages to the scientific
community once bestowed, and the credibility of the entire scientific
community may suffer.
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